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1 The nature of China‘s intergovernmental relations is a hotly debated topic. While none
of  the  scholars  involved  in  this  debate  would  deny  that  a  significant  degree  of
decentralisation has taken place in the course of reform and opening, there is still wide
disagreement  as  to  whether  politics  in  China  can  genuinely  be  characterised  as
“decentralised.“  Zheng Yongnian takes  a  rather  extreme position in  this  debate  by
declaring China a de facto federalist state, a claim he wishes to illustrate by taking a
“behavioural approach“ to central-local relations.
2 In  its  eight  chapters,  the  book  provides  the  reader  with  acute  observations  and
important  theoretical  insights.  However,  it  also  suffers  from  some  conceptual  and
theoretical  shortcomings.  For  example,  the  interesting  empirical  chapters  are  only
marginally related to the theoretical  part of  the book,  and the frequent use of  key
social  science  concepts  outside  of  their  established  definitions  sometimes  makes  it
difficult to follow Zheng’s argument.
3 In  the  first  three  chapters,  Zheng  summarises  existing  approaches  to  central-local
relations in China, lays out his conceptual framework, and traces the historical roots of
“decentralisation” in China. His key concept, “de facto federalism,“ does not, as one
might expect,  denote a constitutionally or otherwise explicitly protected division of
powers between two levels of government, but rather:
4 …a relatively institutionalised pattern which involves an explicit or implicit bargain
between  the  centre  and  the  provinces,  one  element  in  the  bargain  being  that  the
provinces receive certain institutionalised or ad hoc benefits in return for guarantees
by provincial officials that they will behave in certain ways on behalf of the centre. (p.
39)
Yongnian Zheng, De Facto Federalism in China: Reforms and Dynamics of Central...
China Perspectives, 2009/2 | 2009
1
5 The  “institutions“  embedded  in  this  “structure,”  Zheng  claims,  are  “coercion,”
“bargaining,“  and  “reciprocity,”  and  it is  the  role  of  reciprocity  in  central-local
relations  to  which Zheng particularly  wishes  to  contribute  an understanding.  Most
existing studies, he correctly stresses, emphasise the role of coercion (which he seems
to equate with the nomenclatura system) and bargaining in central-local relations, but
not  of  the  “norms  of  interaction“  that  have  formed  through  repeated  bargaining
processes. This is undoubtedly true, and there are good methodological reasons for this
deficiency.  Coercion  and  bargaining  are  directly  observable  actions  (though  not
institutions), whereas the evolution of mutuality between the centre and 31 province-
level governments is much harder to fathom. We are in dire need of theoretical and
methodological innovations that tackle these difficulties to gain more insights into the
black box of elite politics, and Zheng Yongnian‘s attempt to make such a contribution
deserves high praise.
6 Having laid  out  his  conceptual  framework,  Zheng traces  the  origins  of  present-day
decentralisation, a term that is generally understood to mean the transfer of rights and
responsibilities to subordinate administrative levels. Hence, his definition of the term
as  “withdrawing  national  institutions  from  and  reducing  the  presence  of  national
power in local areas“ (p.245) is quite unconventional. Moreover, the concept is
stretched to cover not only intra-governmental but also state-society relations (p.42).
As a consequence, the boundaries with other important concepts such as privatisation,
liberalisation,  and  state  capacity  become  blurred.  The  pitfalls  of  this  rather
indiscriminate  use  of  key  social  science  concepts  become  apparent  when  Zheng
repeatedly  characterises  the  Great  Leap  Forward  as  “excessive  decentralisation.”
Applying the above definition would mean that one of the worst man-made disasters in
China‘s  history was the result  of  the withdrawal  of  the central  state and not,  as  is
commonly held, its excessive encroachment on the lives and minds of China‘s rural
population.
7 After this lengthy theoretical treatise, the author suddenly turns to “thick description”
as  a  method  of  “interpretation”  (xii),  leaving  the  reader  to  tie  the  cumbersome
theoretical approach to the pleasantly detailed description that follows in chapters 4 to
7.
8 Chapter  4  shows  how the  Jiangsu  provincial  government  used  newlywon economic
freedom  to  govern  the  province  “on  behalf  of  the  centre”  (p.115).  Without  much
central  intervention,  Zheng  shows,  Jiangsu  was  able  to  flexibly  implement  growth
policies suited to local circumstances. The chapter highlights the crucial role of the
Jiangsu  provincial  government  in  making  collective  industry  more  efficient  and  in
building  markets  through  the  decentralisation  of  economic  decision-making  in  the
municipalities  as  well  as  through  the  promotion  of  horizontal  linkages between
enterprises within the province and with other provinces. However, Zheng also points
out  that  “the  budget  plan  had  to  be  in  line  with  central  policy  and  the  central
government  still  had  authority  in  approving  the  province’s  budget  and  financial
accounts” (p.132).  In a similar vein,  the chapter shows how the province was quite
active in developing an export strategy and rural  industry,  albeit  within the policy
guidelines set by the central government.
9 Chapter 5 analyses the development of Zhejiang’s relationship with the centre. Again,
the author highlights in great detail how the provincial government fostered economic
growth within the broad guidelines set by the centre. Zhejiang is a relevant case in this
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respect because its economic success was mainly due to its burgeoning private sector
and its early and successful export strategy. As in all other empirical chapters, Zheng
proves that history matters by tracing in great detail the historical roots of prevalent
local ownership forms and the relationship of the province with the centre. And again,
much care is devoted to narrating in great detail the locally generated development
strategies and their regional differentiation. Unwillingly, Zheng also shows that it does
not make much sense to treat the centre as a monolithic entity, which is exactly what
his approach implicitly does. He explains how the central leadership was evenly split in
the early years of Reform and Opening on the issue of private ownership, and how the
Wenzhou model of privatising local industry received only tacit support.
10 The case of Guangdong, which is analysed in Chapter 6, is somewhat different from the
cases discussed before. Zheng illustrates how Guangdong’s development long served as
an example for other provinces to emulate, only to be stripped of its prerogatives in
1998. The reason for this turnaround, Zheng claims, is that Guangdong’s localism had
become “excessive,” by which he means the problems of smuggling and corruption (p.
250). In addition, decentralisation came to be perceived as hurting national interests.
According to Zheng, it worsened disparities, undermined laws, and stifled innovation.
Thus, a “paradigm change” took place, manifested in a shift from decentralisation to
“selective recentralisation” (p.259).
11 The Economic Cooperation Association (ECASC), which is the subject of Chapter 7, is
less  an  example  of  reciprocity  than  of  bargaining.  Here  Zheng  shows  how  the
economically  weaker  south-western  provinces  formed  a  coalition,  first  to  better
implement central policies, but later to co-ordinate regional development and increase
their  leverage  vis-à-vis  the  centre.  Zheng  narrates  in  great  detail  how  the  ECASC
overcame  internal  co-operation  problems,  became  increasingly  selfconfident,  and
learned to play the “minority card” in their collective bargaining with the centre. I
found it most interesting that the ECASC received support from the very same leading
politicians in the central government who later sat on the other side of the bargaining
table (p.345).
12 Interesting as these chapters are, they also show how diverse the relationships between
the (divided) central  government and individual  provinces are.  This  diversity alone
makes it  difficult  to uniformly apply the “de-facto federalism” label  to the Chinese
polity.  However,  this  challenge  is  not  taken up,  and a  systematic  treatment  of  the
mechanisms that regulate the relationship between the centre and the provinces is
found lacking. Moreover, the core assumption of the book that “reciprocity” rather
than  coercion  and  bargaining  characterises  central-local  relations  unfortunately
remains completely unexamined.
13 In a similar vein, it seems doubtful that the term “de facto federalism“ can be genuinely
applied without stretching the well-defined concept of federalism beyond recognition.
In the case of Guangdong, for example, Zheng argues that “selective recentralization“
actually  consolidated  de-facto  federalism,  because  it  more  clearly  delineated  the
separation of powers between the various levels. However, he fails to specify which
powers inviolably belong to provinces and which to the centre. Hence, given that the
central  government has proven itself  able to restrict  local  autonomy in almost any
policy field, the concept verges on tautology: de facto federalism (nonintervention by
the centre) exists where central intervention has not (yet) occurred.
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14 Given the strengths and shortcomings of the book, it comes recommended to those who
are interested in the various forms of economic governance in the provinces Zheng
covers.  For those studying central-local relations,  it  provides a basis from which to
further probe the difficult issue of institutionalised reciprocity in China’s fragmented
polity.
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